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Recently, Clark and Wildman have argued against a thesis 
about mental causation, due to Kroedel and Schulz, called 
the causal grounding thesis. A programmatic idea driving 
the causal grounding thesis is that instances of mental 
causation are always grounded by corresponding instances 
of purely physical causation. The causal grounding thesis 
goes beyond this programmatic idea by providing a 
substantial specification of how this occurs. The causal 
grounding thesis is of considerable philosophical interest 
because it is instrumental in Kroedel and Schulz’s attempt 
to develop non-reductive physicalism about the mind in 
such a way that the infamous exclusion problem is avoided. 
This paper extends Kroedel and Schulz’s defense of the 
causal grounding thesis and replies to Clark and Wildman’s 
concerns.
Keywords: Non-reductive Physicalism; Exclusion 
Argument; Causal Grounding; Mental Causation
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Section 1 Introduction to Non-reductive physicalism and its 
exclusion argument.
Non-Reductive physicalism (henceforth: NRP) has many variants 
but, following List and Menzies, I will understand NRP as the conjunction 
of the following the claims
1. All mental properties are distinct from physical properties.
2. Mental properties supervene on physical properties in the 
sense that there cannot be a difference with respect to mental 
properties without a further difference with respect to physical 
properties.
3. The mental properties are the causes and effects of other 
properties.1
Claim (1) articulates the non-reductive aspect of NRP as the idea that 
mental properties2 are irreducible to physical properties. As a version 
of physicalism, NRP also claims that physical properties are more 
fundamental than the mental properties. Finally, claim (3) ensures that 
NRP is not a version of epiphenomenalism – it is a view on which mental 
properties are causally active and so it is supposed to capture our intuitive 
thought about how our minds can influence, and be influenced by, the 
world around us.
The Exclusion Argument
According to the exclusion argument, the three theses of NRP are 
jointly inconsistent. This argument – first developed by Jaegwon Kim – 
depends on the exclusion principle:
If a property E is causally sufficient for some effect F then 
no distinct property E* that supervenes on E can be a cause 
of the effect F.3
Since – according to physicalists, at least – the mental supervenes 
on the physical, the exclusion principle implies that mental states and 
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their physical grounds cannot play the same causal roles. One of them 
has to be excluded. The physical property is more fundamental for the 
NRP, leaving the physical cause as the sole cause and the mental cause 
is causally excluded.  E.g., If the pain is a mental event that supervenes 
on the physical event C-fibres firing, then the latter is causally sufficient 
for Bill to wince and the mental state – the pain – is causally redundant. 
The exclusion principle expresses skepticism about systematic 
overdetermination. When there are two causes for one effect, there is 
causal overdetermination. Two balls, each simultaneously thrown at a 
window hard enough to break it, might overdetermine the window’s 
breaking. When applied to mental causation, the pain and its physical 
grounds both cause the wincing. Moreover, for any mental state m that 
causes some effect e, it seems there will be some distinct physical state 
that is simultaneous with m – namely, m’s grounds (or supervenience 
base) – which is itself a sufficient cause for e. Hence NRP seems to 
imply the existence of widespread causal overdetermination: whenever 
we have a putative mental cause for some effect e, there will also be a 
corresponding physical state (perhaps a state of the brain) which causes 
e. And widespread causal overdetermination seems problematic.
So, the question is: What causal-explanatory role is left for mental 
states to play, under NRP? It seems that we could deny all instances of 
mental causation without commitment to any more causally unexplained 
events, since any causal-explanatory role that a mental event m can play 
is also played by the physical (e.g., brain) events that m supervenes on. 
It is tempting to conclude that we should deny the existence of mental 
causation for reasons of parsimony, since such a denial enables us to avoid 
ontological commitment to a class of entities (namely, instances of mental 
causation) without reducing the explanatoriness of the overall theory.
Grounding and Grounding Physicalism
The notion of “ground” arrived into contemporary analytic 
metaphysics at the beginning of the twenty-first century; however, 
the notion’s roots arguably go back to Aristotle (see Fine, 1995 and 
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Schaffer, 2009). Sometimes grounding is understood as being a form of 
“metaphysical explanation.”4 Grounding is most intuitively understood 
as a relation of noncausal determination. It is a metaphysical relation 
between a ground and a grounded entity. The ground is considered more 
fundamental than the grounded entity, and the grounded entity depends, 
non-causally, on its more fundamental grounds. 
The following plausible examples of grounding are taken from 
Clark and Liggins (2012) 
(A) The brittleness of the cup results from the way its constituent 
atoms are arranged.
(B) The truth-value of a proposition is determined by how the 
world is.
(C) Actions have their moral properties in virtue of their non-moral 
properties.
(D) Non-empty sets depend on their existence on their members.
(E) A mental state is grounded in the brain state which realizes it.5
Clark & Liggins (2012) pointed out that none of the above 
examples is plausible if understood causally. For one thing, none of these 
examples exhibits the temporal asymmetry that is characteristic of causal 
relations. Furthermore, the explanatory connections cited in (A)-(E) 
seem to be modally stronger than causal relations – they seem to hold of 
metaphysical, rather than merely causal, necessity.
Grounding Physicalism, as developed by Kroedel and Schulz, is 
a version of NRP that is formulated explicitly in terms of grounding, and 
claims that all instances of mental properties are grounded by instances of 
physical properties. (Kroedel and Schulz, 2016, P.1-2; Stenwall, 2020, P.3). 
In particular, grounding physicalism adds the following thesis to NRP:
Grounding - Necessarily, all mental property instances are 
grounded in physical property instances.
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Given that grounding is closely connected to the concept of 
fundamentality, grounding physicalism seems to imply that mental 
properties are less fundamental in the instances of grounding. The concept 
of supervenience is not closely connected to the concept of fundamentality. 
So, grounding physicalism captures – as NRP arguably does not – the 
physicalist’s intuition that the physical is prior to the mental. (Kroedel 
and Schulz, 2015)
Section 3 Causal Grounding
The grounding thesis says that mental events are always grounded 
by physical events. But what about mental-causal relations? This is where 
the causal grounding principle plays a role, since this principle implies that 
mental causation is not fundamental and depends on its physical grounds:
Causal grounding - Let m be a mental event, and let e 
be a physical effect of m. Then there is a physical event p 
such that p grounds m and m causes e because p causes e.6  
 In this way, ontological worries about mental causal relations – 
worries that such relations are gratuitous additions to the causally closed 
physical system revealed by science – are assuaged by the thought that 
mental causal relations are always physically explainable and can thus 
“dispel the worry that the overdetermination of the physical effects of 
mental causes is a surprising coincidence” (Kroedel and Schulz 2015). 
Thus, causal grounding provides the materials for an intuitively plausible 
solution to the exclusion argument.
One of the benefits of causal grounding is the solution to the 
exclusion problem. But Clark and Wildman (2018) argue that the 
Causal grounding principle is undermotivated and subject to plausible 
counterexamples. 
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These counterexamples rely on the idea that some mental 
states are grounded by facts that are external to the mental 
state’s bearer – mental states that are not fully grounded by 
“going on in our heads” but also require external factors to 
be included in their grounds.”
 Clark and Wildman argue that causal grounding is incompatible 
with certain externalist theses about the mind and mental content. They 
conclude that it remains unclear whether causal grounding can be appealed 
to in a plausible response to the exclusion argument. I will by offering 
two arguments for the causal grounding thesis, one being an argument 
from ontological parsimony, and another concerning narrow content. 
Argument from Ontological Innocence
Grounding physicalism implies that all mental events are grounded 
in purely physical events. Following Schaffer, we can take this to imply 
that mental events are ‘ontologically innocent’ – nothing ‘over and above’ 
their physical grounds. In Armstrong’s phrase, they are ‘ontological free 
lunches’:
Armstrong makes crucial use of the notion of ‘the 
ontological free lunch’: ‘whatever supervenes … is not 
something ontologically additional to the subvenient, 
or necessitating, entity or entities. What supervenes is 
no addition to being’. [I]n Aristotelian terms, there is a 
straightforward way to understand Armstrong: whatever is 
dependent is not fundamental, and thus no addition to the 
sparse basis. Thus, Armstrong’s notion of an ontological 
free lunch seems best understood against an Aristotelian 
background.8
 
In another paper, Schaffer develops this idea as follows:
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derivative entities are an ‘ontological free lunch’, in the 
sense that they are genuinely new and distinct entities but 
they cost nothing by measure of economy …. Derivative 
entities are additional commitments, but they cost nothing. 
More precisely: derivative entities cost nothing further, 
beyond the cost incurred for positing their fundamental 
grounds.9
Clark and Wildman point out that, just because mental events are 
grounded in physical events, it does not automatically follow that mental 
causation is physically grounded as well: 
[E]ven if mental events are ontologically innocent, this 
is not enough to secure the ontological innocence of the 
causal relations into which those mental events enter. 
Even if mental events are grounded in physical events, it 
doesn’t automatically follow that mental causation is. If 
mental event m is grounded in physical event p, it doesn’t 
automatically follow that m’s causing some event, e, is 
physically grounded, nor does it follow that m’s causing 
e doesn’t require the addition of something ontologically 
significant. Worries about parsimony apply not only to 
events, but also to the causal relations into which they 
enter. Consequently, non-reductive physicalists have to tell 
us why mental causation is ontologically innocent, why it 
adds nothing ontologically significant. 10
We can concede this point. But still, if the causal grounding 
thesis is true, then the ontological innocence of grounded mental events 
passes directly over to the causal relations that those mental events enter 
into. This enables us to endorse commonsensical claims about mental 
causation without ontological commitment to ungrounded mental-causal 
relations. This is a powerful argument from parsimony in favor of the 
causal grounding thesis. Even if, as Clark and Wildman argue, the theory 
is inconsistent with externalist theses about mental content, this argument 
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from parsimony might lead us to reconsider those externalist theses.
Argument from Narrow Content
Often, mental states have meaning or content. Broad content mental 
states are those whose meaning depends, not just on the states internal 
to the thinker – specifically, their brain states – but also on aspects of 
their wider environment. Narrow-content mental states are intrinsic and 
depend only on states internal to the thinker. Brown (2016) summarized:
Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does 
not depend on an individual’s environment. Narrow content 
contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends 
on features of the individual’s environment as well as on 
features of the individual. It is controversial whether there 
is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there 
is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what 
its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is 
determined by the individual’s intrinsic properties.11
Clark and Wildman (2018) argue that some mental states, including 
knowledge and belief states, plausibly depend on external factors. 
Moreover, they claim that some such broad-content mental states are 
causally efficacious. This idea is the crux of their critique of the causal 
grounding thesis. For, if a person s has a causally efficacious mental state 
m, and if m’s physical grounds are scattered across s’s wider environment, 
then there is no reason to expect that those physical grounds are apt to play 
m’s causal roles – after all, they likely do not share m’s spatio-temporal 
location. Perhaps we could reply by saying that only narrow-content 
mental states are causally efficacious.
  
Philosophers sometimes contrast wide content beliefs, 
whose content depends on features of the believer’s 
external environment, with narrow content beliefs, whose 
contents do not so depend. With this distinction in hand, 
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defenders of CG might respond to the present objection 
by following Fodor (1987) in only taking narrow content 
beliefs to be causally efficacious. This ensures that the 
grounds for any given belief will be local to the believer 
and so will be suitable for slotting into the belief’s causal 
role (and likewise for other kinds of causally efficacious 
mental states).12
But they go on to argue that this is mistaken, appealing to externalist ideas 
familiar from the work of Putnam (1975) and Burge:
[C]onsider a person who is familiar with aluminium but 
who lacks an account of aluminium that would enable 
him to distinguish it from all other actual or possible 
metals. He is able to think about aluminium, despite his 
lack of theoretical knowledge on the matter. For example, 
his belief that aluminium is lighter than lead concerns 
aluminium, as opposed to an imaginary superficially 
identical but chemically different metal twaluminium. 
This is not because he is able to distinguish the two 
metals. It is about aluminium because he happens to have 
encountered aluminium in the world in which he lives; the 
external fact that he is in a world containing aluminium 
and not twaluminium partly explains why his beliefs are 
about aluminium and not twaluminium. In this way, his 
aluminium beliefs are externalist; moreover, if externalism 
about aluminium beliefs is warranted, it seems that a very 
large body of our beliefs about the world will require 
an externalist treatment as well. Whatever we say about 
knowledge states, it seems intuitively clear that many of 
our beliefs are causally efficacious. Jimbo’s belief that 
a certain chunk of metal is aluminium might cause him 
to say “aluminium” if somebody asks him to identify its 
chemical kind. But if this belief is partly grounded by an 
expansive portion of Jimbo’s surrounding environment, 
there is no reason at all to expect that the full grounds of 
Jimbo’s belief will be hooked up to the effects of Jimbo’s 
belief in the manner that CG predicts
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A narrow content belief in the vicinity of Jimbo’s belief that 
his chunk is aluminium would be a belief whose content 
does not vary between aluminium and twaluminium worlds. 
A narrow content surrogate for Jimbo’s aluminium belief 
might be a belief that the chunk is a grey metal, with such 
and such relevant additional properties. But, while this 
narrow content belief may be causally efficacious in its own 
right, it is no substitute for Jimbo’s belief that the chunk is 
aluminium. For all we have said, Jimbo may not even have 
the narrow content belief in addition to the wide-content 
one (for instance, he might lack the concept of greyness). 
Moreover, aluminium-concerning beliefs seem to have 
effects that narrow content surrogates lack. If we want to 
causally explain why Jimbo picked up a piece of aluminium, 
it is his aluminium-concerning beliefs and desires that we 
need to cite. Narrow content beliefs and desires, being 
neutral between aluminium and twaluminium, are not 
suitable for bringing about the effect that Jimbo picks 
up a lump of aluminium: in the terminology of Yablo 
(1992), they are not proportional to this effect, since in a 
twaluminium-infested twin world, these beliefs and desires 
would result in Jimbo picking up a lump of twaluminium 
instead. In this sense, the narrow content beliefs are not 
causally sufficient for the effect in question.13
These views are highly contentious and are disputed, for example, by 
Bach (1998) and Crane (1991), who writes:
The Putnam/ Burge arguments do not, I think, force us to 
opt for broad or narrow mindedness. I will argue not only 
that their conclusions are fundamentally opposed to crucial 
assumptions we are obliged to make about causation and 
the causal role of mental states, but also that the arguments 
for these conclusions are unsound. There is no Twin Earth 
problem of the kind Putnam, Burge and many others think 
there is. So there is no need to respond to it with broad- or 
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narrow-mindedness. But here I shall return to Putnam’s and 
Burge’s original arguments, and dispute them. My excuse 
for adding another paper to the already vast literature is that 
if my arguments are right, they will help not just to solve, 
but to dissolve the Twin Earth problem.14
  
It is impossible to assess these controversies here. But Clark and 
Wildman (2018) make a dialectical point: that the causal grounding thesis 
incurs a substantial theoretical cost, in the form of a commitment to strong 
internalist claims about mental content or to the claim that only narrow-
content mental states are causally efficacious. In reply, it seems to me that, 
since the debate about externalism is ongoing, it is unclear how much 
of a cost this is. Indeed, taking into account a wider range of costs and 
benefits might persuade us that taking on these internalist commitments 
provides the best overall package of views. Let us consider the ledger.
On the one hand, we have grounding physicalism, with the causal-
grounding thesis, and whatever unobvious but non-absurd internalist 
assumptions are needed, allowing us to combine non-reductive physicalism 
with all the common-sensical mental-causal claims we like. This is an 
appealing combination of views.  The alternative seems to be accepting 
a view on which the only way to endorse common-sense mental-causal 
claims is to posit a host of ungrounded mental-causal relations. This, I 
claim, is a more costly overall package of views.
Section 5 Conclusion
I have argued for the causal grounding principle. Causal grounding 
is an assumption worth making and taking it as a default view for 
physicalism because it assumes fewer fundamental entities and facts. 
Although, as Clark and Wildman note, it comes with substantial theoretical 
commitments, it is unclear how costly these are – and by accepting the 
causal grounding thesis, we can get a plausible version of non-reductive 
physicalism that has materials for an intuitively satisfying reply to the 
exclusion argument. 
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